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JAPAN’S TWO LOST DECADES:  







Japan experienced an economic boom in the middle of the 1980s. 
Commercial land prices in the Tokyo area increased by 57% in 1987, 
while those in the Osaka area rose by 36%, 36%, and 40% in 1988, 1989, 
and 1990, respectively. The Nikkei index increased from 12,565 yen in 
1985 to 38,915 yen in December 1989. These increases led to capital gains 
from 1987–89 of 1,343 trillion yen, more than three times the Japanese 
GDP in 1989. 
The boom ended in 1990 and 1991, and the Japanese economy has 
stagnated for the last twenty years. GDP increased slightly after the 
collapse but stagnated once again with the onset of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. Today, due to the Lehman Brothers shock in 2008, the GDP 
is almost as low as it was in 1991 (Fig. 3-1). 
Economists have thoroughly studied the lost decades of the 1990s and 
2000s.1 The main issues are the following: 
 
A) Why Japan has experienced such a long recession. 
B) What remedies Japan should utilise to overcome the crisis: 
1) from the demand side: fiscal and/or monetary policies, and 
                                                          
1 A number of books and articles have been published investigating why Japan 
experienced such a long recession. Okita (2010) discusses the Japanese post-war 
economy. Miyazaki (1992) is a memorable book on causes and impacts of the 
bubble. Chapter 19 of Hashimoto (2011) gives a very concise overview of the 
recession. Ogawa (2009), Kataoka (2010) and Otaki (2011) looked back the history 
of lost two decades. Itoh et al. (2005) and Iwata and Miyagawa (2003) collected 
discussions from both supply and demand sides. Todou (2011), Ono (2012) and 
many others discuss how to overcome the long recession from either the supply or 
demand side. 
Masahiko Yoshii 37 
2) from the supply side: how to raise productivity through 
structural reform. 
C) The effects of the lost decades: 
1) on the Japanese economy, 
2) on the ageing society, etc. 
 
In this paper, we will summarise these discussions and attempt to draw 




Fig. 3-1 GDP and its growth rate 
Source: Cabinet Office (2011, 343) 
2. After the feast 
In 1991, the Japanese boom ended and the lost decades began. In the 
beginning, there were two serious problems: (1) an unused production 
capacity problem and (2) a balance sheet problem. During the bubble, 
Japanese companies expanded their production capacities on the 
assumption that the economic boom would never end. For example, the 
number of cars produced increased from 8.0 million in 1985 to 13.2 
million in 1991, only to decrease to 10.8 million in 1995 (Statistics Bureau 
2011a). With the bust, these capacities became excessive. 
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When the bubble burst in 1991, the capacity utilising rate of the 
manufacturing industry as a whole dropped from a rate of 100–110 to 90–
100 (Fig. 3-2). The capacity utilisation rate of the automobile industry 
decreased drastically to a rate of 70–80; the steel industry soon fell to a 
similar level. 
As Japanese companies reduced investment, productivity stagnated 
and, in the second half of the 1990s, unemployment began to increase. 
The more serious problem was the balance sheet problem. With 
Japanese companies believing that land prices would remain high, they 
increased borrowing with land as collateral. When land prices began to 
fall, the land standard system – borrowing with land used as collateral  
new production capacities  sales increase  profit increase  price 
increase  land price (collateral) hikes  borrowing – also collapsed, and 
non-performing loans abounded. The non-performing loan problem was 
most serious in the real estate, construction, and wholesale & retail sectors, 
as these three sectors very prominently expanded their capacities on the 




Fig. 3-2 Capacity utilisation rates 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the data of Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (2011)  
 
 
Masahiko Yoshii 39 
 
 
Fig. 3-3 Non-performing loan problems 
Source: Cabinet Office (2002, 34) 
 
Though Japanese banks faced increasing numbers of non-performing 
loans within the above three sectors, they, somewhat surprisingly, 
continued lending to these companies. The banks, companies, and 
government all believed that the economy would soon recover, but this 
was not to be. Some companies within these three sectors went bankrupt, 
and the non-performing loan problem was transferred onto the banking 
sector. 
Figure 3-4 reveals that the non-performing loan problem first impacted 
the banking sector in 1995, four years after the bubble burst, and that it 
took nearly seven years to resolve. There are several reasons why this took 
so long. First, the companies, banks, and government all underestimated 
the seriousness of the recession. Second, in the beginning, the definition of 
non-performing loan was excessively narrowly defined by the 
government. Third, a debate on who was responsible for the costs of the 
non-performing loans took place. In particular, the general public could 
not consent to the idea that the non-financial sectors or the financial 
companies with non-performing loans would be bailed out by tax-payer 
money. Finally, the Ministry of Finance tried to sustain the convoy system 
(Goso Sendan Houshiki) by adjusting the banking regulations so that not 
even the worst-off banks would fall into bankruptcy. For example, each 
bank offered the same interest rate on deposits. 
 





Fig. 3-4 Banking sector’s non-performing loans 
Source: Cabinet Office (2002, 47) 
 
The situation dramatically changed in November 1997 when two large 
financial institutions went bankrupt. First, Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank, one 
of the largest Japanese banks, failed due to a resort development project in 
Hokkaido and closed its doors on 15 November. Then, Yamaichi Security, 
the second largest security company after Nomura, declared bankruptcy on 
24 November due to enormous off-the-book liabilities. 
Insolvencies occurred before these two large financial institutions went 
bankrupt. One example is a bankruptcy of Hyogo Bank several months 
after the Great Awaji Hanshin Earthquake, which hit Kobe, where the 
headquarters of the bank were located, in January 1995. The bankruptcies 
of Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Security signalled that the 
Ministry of Finance could no longer sustain the convoy system, resulting 
in the other large financial institutions substantially increasing the pace of 
their financial consolidations. This led to the establishment of mega-
Masahiko Yoshii 41 
financial systems in Japan: four financial groups2 and the independent 
Nomura Security. 
Discussions on whether the government should inject capital into the 
large banks continued. On the one hand, it was difficult to convince the 
general public that financial institutions should be bailed out by tax-payer 
money. On the other hand, the large banks refused to accept the capital 
injections because they were afraid of being nationalised. 
In October 2002, the Koizumi Cabinet settled on the “Program for 
Financial Revival”, which dictated that the Financial Services Agency 
normalise the non-performing loans (NPLs) problem by reducing major 
banks’ NPL ratio to approximately one-half (Financial Service Agency 
2002). 
In June 2003, the government injected two trillion yen into Resona 
Bank, whose financial condition was the worst among the mega-banks. 
Other mega-banks augmented their capital by issuing proffered stocks and 
allocating shares to third parties in order to avoid nationalisation.3 As 
shown in Figure 3-5, the large banks’ non-performing loans began to 
decrease from a peak of 25 trillion yen in the beginning of 2002. While 56 
banks went bankrupt in 2001, only one bank has done so since 2002. 
It took more than ten years after the collapse of the bubble to settle the 
non-performing loan problem. It is not difficult to imagine such an 
enduring experience significantly changing the behaviour of Japanese 
companies and households. 
 
A) Banking sector: 
The first consequence of the non-performing loan problem is that 
Japanese banks gradually became reluctant to extend credit to businesses, 
even those with healthy financial outlooks, to preserve the capital 
adequacy ratios defined by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS). 
The role of Japanese banks as funding centres diminished. The second 
consequence is that their role as main banks also decreased. The symbolic 
event was the merger of Sumitomo Bank, the main bank of the Sumitomo 
group, and Sakura Bank, the main bank of the Mitsui group, in 2001. The 
decrease of roles of main banks was not limited to large banks. As small 
banks’ financial positions became more vulnerable and they became less 
willing to extend credit, their roles as main banks to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) also diminished. 
                                                          
2 Mitsubishi Tokyo UFJ Financial Group, the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, 
Mizuho Financial Group, and the Resona Group. 
3 Nishikawa (2011) described how the author, then governor of Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group, overcame the non-performing loan problems. 
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B) Non-banking sectors: 
Most companies within the non-banking sectors also made serious 
efforts to survive the non-performing loan problems. The easiest way was 
to reduce costs by curtailing investments and employment. However, this 
led to the fallacy of composition problem. The fact that investment 
demands and household incomes have not increased is one of the reasons 
why Japanese GDP has stagnated for the last twenty years. However, the 
more serious problem was that curtailing investments led to 
competitiveness losses within Japan’s manufacturing industries. Whether 
the Japanese TFP (total factor productivities) has plateaued is one of the 
biggest discussions on the lost decades (Hayashi and Prescott 2002). 
Discussions on supply-side options ensued. 
 
C) Households: 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Japanese companies tried to 
curtail labour costs, and household incomes have stagnated for the last two 





Fig. 3-5 Resolution of non-performing loans 
Source: Cabinet Office (2004, 85) 
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3. Stimuli to recover 
3.1 Timid attitude of the government in the 1990s 
The Japanese government did not sit idly by as the economy faltered. 
At first, the government tried to support the economy from the demand 
side through active fiscal policies to increase public investments and 
reduce taxes. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) also relaxed monetary policy. The 
government also tried to support the economy from the supply side 
through structural policies. These measures were not successful. 
First, let us look at the fiscal policy of the 1990s (Fig. 3-6). We notice 
the following points. Expenditures increased during the period at 
approximately the same pace. The government had no choice but to 
continue using active fiscal policies since the economy continued to 
stagnate for the next ten years. Second, tax revenue had significantly 
fallen. The government expected that reducing tax rates would save the 
economy and increase tax revenue. However, the expectation was not 
realistic. Third, because of increasing expenditures and decreasing tax 
revenue, the state debt has increased. However, looking at the figure in 
detail, we find that the deficit government bond, which is issued for the 
purpose of covering the budget deficit, was not issued until 1994. This 
might indicate that the government did not strongly intend to stimulate the 




Fig. 3-6 Japanese central government budget 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2011a) 
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Regarding the monetary policy of the 1990s, we notice the timid 
attitude of the Bank of Japan. After the official discount rate reached six 
per cent during 1990, it continued to decline. It was not until 1995, four 
years after the bubble burst, that it reached the bottom level (Fig. 3-7). 
From these facts, we may say that the BoJ might think that keeping the 
interest rate level high enough to hold down the land price hikes was still 
the priority task even after the bubble burst, that the BoJ also thought that 
the Japanese economy would recover soon, and that capital losses could be 




Fig. 3-7 Official discount rate 
Source: Bank of Japan (2011)  
3.2 The government policies of the 2000s 
The 2000s were years of deflation. Returning to Figure 3-1, it shows 
that the nominal GDP growth rates have been less than the real GDP 
growth rates. That means that GDP deflators and price indices were 
negative during the 2000s. Because the macroeconomic environment 
changed in the 2000s, the Japanese government also changed their 
policies. 
Referring to the government budget (Fig. 3-6), we find that the 
government (i.e., the Koizumi Cabinet between April 2001 and September 
2006) tried to curtail expenditures and the issuing of state bonds. This 
fiscal approach saw modest success with a weak but extended boom in the 
middle of the 2000s. 
The Lehman Brothers shock frustrated this fiscal strategy. Expenditures 
increased to 101 trillion yen in FY2009 from the previous year’s 85 trillion 
yen, and state bond issuance increased by 20 trillion yen to 52 trillion yen 
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in FY2009. The Japanese fiscal situation had reached a very dangerous 
point in that the value of the newly issued state bonds surpassed that of tax 
revenue. 
Table 3-1 shows the overnight call rate target, which is today’s policy 
interest rate. The BoJ has adopted a zero interest rate policy since 1999 
(except for a short period between August 2000 and February 2001). 
 
Table 3-1 Overnight call rate target 
 
date overnight rate target remarks 
2/1999 0.15% zero interest rate policy 
11/8/2000 0.25% temporary lift 
28/2/2001 0.15% reintroduction 
14/7/2006 0.25% re-lift 
21/2/2007 0.50%  
31/10/2008 0.30%  
19/12/2008 0.10%  
5/10/2010 0.0 – 0.1%  
Source: Authors own construction by The Bank of Japan 
 
When the IT bubble burst in 2001, the BoJ had no room to lower the 
interest rate. Instead, the BoJ turned to an unconventional quantitative 
easing policy to broaden the monetary base by buying financial assets and 
injecting a pre-determined quantity of money into the economy. This 
increased the excess reserves of the banks. However, comparing how the 
monetary bases in the US, Japan, UK, Euro-area and China were 
broadened (Fig. 3-8), we note that the BoJ was very timid in broadening 
the monetary base during the 2000s. As a result of the BoJ failing to 
broaden the monetary base to an extent similar to the US or the ECB, 
some economists demanded that the BoJ introduce the inflation target 
policy4 and more decisively broaden the monetary base.5 
Let us summarise the reasons why the monetary policies were 
ineffective for the last two decades. First, the priority of the monetary 
policy remained controlling high land prices even after the burst of the 
bubble. Second, a de facto zero interest rate policy began at the end of the 
                                                          
4 At the Monetary Policy Meeting on 14 February, 2012, The BoJ for the first time 
officially mentioned the inflation target, saying that The Bank judges “the price 
stability goal in the medium to long term” to be within a positive range of 2% or 
lower in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI and, more specifically, 
sets a goal at 1% for the time being. 
5 Moriyama (2011) is an example. 
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1990s but was only modest in effect. Third, a de jure zero interest policy 
was introduced in 1999 but was lifted while the recovery remained weak 
and the IT bubble had not yet burst. Fourth, quantitative easing was 
introduced, but the monetary base remained insufficiently large. In sum, 
the BoJ failed to introduce the bold policies necessary to overcome the 




Fig. 3-8 Monetary base balance 
Source: Daiwa Institute of Research (2011) 
4. Structural reforms 
In the previous sections, we have discussed how to increase demand 
via fiscal and monetary policy. However, policies from the supply side 
were also considered. These policies always emphasise the importance of 
breaking away from the Japanese economic system, which was admired 
with Japan as Number One in the 1980s (Vogel 1979). 
 
A) Public structural reforms: 
Public structural reforms were mainly driven by the Koizumi Cabinet. 
Prime Minister Koizumi emphasised it with the phrase “No Reform, No 
Growth.” The three pillars of the reform were: 
 
1. from public to private 
• privatisation of the postal and highway systems, 
• marketisation test, 
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• deregulation of the labour market, 
• integration and abolition of public entities,6 
• promotion of special zones. 
2. from centre to region 
• abolition and curtailment of state subsidies, 
• transfer of tax sources, 
• revision of local allocation tax grants. 
3. other reforms 
• promotion of Free Trade Agreements and Economic 
Partnership Agreements, 
• medical system reform, 
• off-budget system reform. 
 
The most debated reform was privatisation of the postal system. When 
the Postal Service Privatization Act was rejected by the Upper House in 
August 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi dissolved the Lower House and 
called a general election. After Koizumi won the election, the law was 
approved. The Japan Post System was divided into the Japan Post Service, 
Japan Post Bank, Japan Post Insurance, and Japan Post Network.7 
Additionally, labour market reform increased the flexibility of the work 
force. The share of permanent workers decreased from approximately 75% 
in 2000 to approximately 65% in 2009.8 
 
B) Private structural reforms: 
Regarding private structural reform, breaking away from the Japanese 
economic system was the key idea. Some examples follow. 
1. dismantling keiretsu (grouping) 
Under the Japanese economic system, the sub-contracting system was 
widely used. Assembly (parent) companies purchased parts of the products 
from sub-contractors (child companies) under the same keiretsu. The 
keiretsu system began to be dismantled in 1999 when Carlos Ghosn 
became president of Nissan. 
2. dismantling main banks 
Mutual/cross holding of stocks among the group companies, with 
banks being at the top of the cross holding system, was very common. For 
example, Mitsubishi/Sumitomo/Mitsui Banks were the main banks of the 
                                                          
6 National universities were transformed to national university corporations in 
April 2004. 
7 See the organization chart: http://www.japanpost.jp/en/group/map/. 
8 Annual Report on Japanese Economy and Public Finance, FY2009. 
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Mitsubishi/Sumitomo/Mitsui Groups. When these banks began to address 
their non-performing loan problems, they could not afford to maintain the 
main bank system. 
3. corporate governance reform 
Based on the life-long employment system in Japan, most presidents of 
large companies designated their successors, and outsider influence was 
very limited. In 2003, the Commercial Law was revised and some 
Japanese corporations introduced the committee system.9 
5. The consequences of the lost decades 
In the previous sections, we showed how the Japanese government and 
companies struggled to overcome the non-performing loan problem and 
the stagnant economy. The main consequences of the lost decades were the 
following. 
 
A) Competitiveness loss 
Has Japan regained its competitiveness? Japan’s IMD World 
Competitiveness ranking is shown in Figure 3-9. Japan fell from its 
highest competitiveness ranking to today’s ranking of just 26th. The fact 
that today’s GDP is approximately the same as that of 1991 symbolises 




Fig. 3-9 Japanese competitiveness 
Source: Kogures.com (2011) 
                                                          
9 http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/News/Press_Archive/200301/03-004E/ 
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B) State debt 
One of the greatest consequences is the state debt (Fig. 3-10). Because 
of increasing fiscal expenditures and the revenue gap since the end of the 
bubble, state debt has been increasing. Its accumulation accelerated 
particularly after the Lehman Brothers shock of 2008. The state debt at the 
end of Fiscal Year 2011 (March 2012) was 667 trillion yen, 141% of GDP. 
It should be noted that this debt is the responsibility of the central 
government alone. Adding the local government debts, the figure increases 
to 894 trillion yen, 189% of GDP (Ministry of Finance 2011a). The 
general government debt, which includes the social security fund deficit, 
etc., is 1,024 trillion yen, almost 200% of GDP (Ministry of Finance 
2011a). 
These figures are the worst among advanced economies, even 
considering the Greek figures. However, the possibility of fiscal insolvency 
in the short term is limited since almost all of the state debt is held by the 
Japanese people. 
The risk of fiscal insolvency in the long term, however, is high. As the 
Japanese society ages at an increasing rate, expenditures for social security 
will increase. At the same time, the Japanese saving ratio will decrease, 
leading to a current account deficit. These trends may force the Japanese 
credit rating to be lowered, increasing interest rates and making it more 




Fig. 3-10 Central government debts 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2011b)  
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C) Public structural reforms 
As mentioned earlier, the postal and highway systems, as well as other 
public corporation systems, were reformed in the 2000s. Before this, there 
were reforms of the national railway, telegraph and telephone, and tobacco 
and salt public corporations during the 1980s (today’s Japan Railway (JR) 
networks, NTT groups (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation), 
and Japan Tobacco). 
Except for some of the JR groups (JRs Hokkaido, Shikoku, Kyushu 
and Freight), which have never turned a profit due to their challenging 
geographical situations, shares of the formerly public corporations were 
sold to the public. They were, genuinely speaking, privatised. 
Shares of the Japan Post and the Japan Highway groups, however, 
remain in the hands of the government. They were corporatized, but their 
privatisation, i.e. concrete tender programs, have not yet been finalised. 
Furthermore, due to the ousting of the Liberal Democratic Party, which 
had ruled Japanese politics for more than fifty years, in 2009, the 
privatisation program of the Japan Post group is now being reconsidered. 
D) Private structural reforms 
Regarding private company reforms, we have seen that corporate 
governance and other reforms were initiated in the 2000s, but they have 
not yet borne fruit. For example, Sony is thought to have lost its 
innovative edge (Tateishi 2011 and Tsujino 2011), has posted losses every 
year since FY2008, and has announced the dissolution of its joint venture 
with Samsung to produce LCD panels. Furthermore, window-dressing 
settlements of Olympus and unjust financing to the former chairperson by 
Daio Paper have revealed that corporate social responsibility has not 
penetrated sufficiently into Japanese corporations. 
6. Conclusions 
We summarise what we have discussed as follows. 
 
In the 1990s: 
• The Japanese government and private sector had optimistic views 
of the recession after the bubble burst in 1991. They thought the 
recession would come to an end soon and that the virtuous cycle 
of the Japanese economic system, including the land standard 
system, would work well again. This belief caused a delay in 
acknowledging the seriousness of the recession. 
• The stimulus fiscal package was too little, too late. 
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• The monetary authority was afraid of the land price hikes and 
their monetary policies were timid. 
• The collapse of the bubble caused the non-performing loan 
problems in the non-manufacturing three sectors and then in the 
banking sector. It was not until 2002 that the non-performing loan 
problem in the banking sector was resolved. 
• GDP increased a little even after the collapse of the bubble, but 
stopped growing in 1997 when the Asian financial crisis took 
place. 
 
In the 2000s: 
• The non-performing loan problems were resolved in 2002 after 
the Koizumi Cabinet settled on the “Program for Financial 
Revival.” 
• In the process of resolving the non-performing loan problems, 
Japanese banks became reluctant to lend to companies, especially 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
• Even during the weak but long boom of the 2000s, Japan’s state 
debt continued to increase. After the IT bubble burst in 2001 and 
the Lehman Brothers shock in 2008, extremely aggressive fiscal 
policies made the state debt situation much worse. Today, the 
state debt is valued at 200% of GDP. 
• The state debt is a serious concern for the ageing society of Japan. 
• The Japanese government tried to implement structural policies to 
raise productivity and increase the effectiveness of the economy. 
However, the government policies were not bold enough to be 
successful. 
• Japanese companies tried to reform themselves. However, the 
reforms were insufficient and the Japanese economy has not 
recovered its competitiveness of the 1980s. 
 
The EU economy has been seriously damaged by the Lehman Brothers 
shock and the euro crisis. Most EU member countries have accumulated 
large sovereign and private debts since 2008 (although the Japanese debt 
remains higher). 
The EU economy is now searching for an exit from their unhealthy 
situation. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will come into 
force in September 2012, is expected to reform the functioning of the euro 
zone. It is also expected to accelerate the fiscal consolidation process and 
to facilitate harmonisation of the fiscal systems among the member 
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countries. The EU also adopted the “Europe 2020” strategy to increase its 
competitiveness. 
However, the Japanese experience shows that these efforts will not 
bear fruit if the governments, the ECB, and the companies do not take 
prompt and decisive measures. If they do not, they may also experience at 
least two lost decades. 
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